1
0

Merge branch 'develop' of github.com:matrix-org/synapse into neilj/default-room-version-v4

This commit is contained in:
Neil Johnson
2019-06-06 17:37:08 +01:00
35 changed files with 1319 additions and 180 deletions

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@@ -36,8 +36,6 @@ steps:
image: "python:3.6"
propagate-environment: true
- wait
- command:
- "python -m pip install tox"
- "tox -e check-sampleconfig"
@@ -46,6 +44,8 @@ steps:
- docker#v3.0.1:
image: "python:3.6"
- wait
- command:
- "python -m pip install tox"
- "tox -e py27,codecov"

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@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
* [Prebuilt packages](#prebuilt-packages)
* [Setting up Synapse](#setting-up-synapse)
* [TLS certificates](#tls-certificates)
* [Email](#email)
* [Registering a user](#registering-a-user)
* [Setting up a TURN server](#setting-up-a-turn-server)
* [URL previews](#url-previews)
@@ -394,9 +395,31 @@ To configure Synapse to expose an HTTPS port, you will need to edit
instance, if using certbot, use `fullchain.pem` as your certificate, not
`cert.pem`).
For those of you upgrading your TLS certificate in readiness for Synapse 1.0,
For those of you upgrading your TLS certificate for Synapse 1.0 compliance,
please take a look at [our guide](docs/MSC1711_certificates_FAQ.md#configuring-certificates-for-compatibility-with-synapse-100).
## Email
It is desirable for Synapse to have the capability to send email. For example,
this is required to support the 'password reset' feature.
To configure an SMTP server for Synapse, modify the configuration section
headed ``email``, and be sure to have at least the ``smtp_host``, ``smtp_port``
and ``notif_from`` fields filled out. You may also need to set ``smtp_user``,
``smtp_pass``, and ``require_transport_security``..
If Synapse is not configured with an SMTP server, password reset via email will
be disabled by default.
Alternatively it is possible delegate the sending of email to the server's
identity server. Doing so is convenient but not recommended, since a malicious
or compromised identity server could theoretically hijack a given user's
account by redirecting mail.
If you are absolutely certain that you wish to use the server's identity server
for password resets, set ``trust_identity_server_for_password_resets`` to
``true`` under the ``email:`` configuration section.
## Registering a user
You will need at least one user on your server in order to use a Matrix

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@@ -49,6 +49,55 @@ returned by the Client-Server API:
# configured on port 443.
curl -kv https://<host.name>/_matrix/client/versions 2>&1 | grep "Server:"
Upgrading to v1.0
=================
Validation of TLS certificates
------------------------------
Synapse v1.0 is the first release to enforce
validation of TLS certificates for the federation API. It is therefore
essential that your certificates are correctly configured. See the `FAQ
<docs/MSC1711_certificates_FAQ.md>`_ for more information.
Note, v1.0 installations will also no longer be able to federate with servers
that have not correctly configured their certificates.
In rare cases, it may be desirable to disable certificate checking: for
example, it might be essential to be able to federate with a given legacy
server in a closed federation. This can be done in one of two ways:-
* Configure the global switch ``federation_verify_certificates`` to ``false``.
* Configure a whitelist of server domains to trust via ``federation_certificate_verification_whitelist``.
See the `sample configuration file <docs/sample_config.yaml>`_
for more details on these settings.
Email
-----
When a user requests a password reset, Synapse will send an email to the
user to confirm the request.
Previous versions of Synapse delegated the job of sending this email to an
identity server. If the identity server was somehow malicious or became
compromised, it would be theoretically possible to hijack an account through
this means.
Therefore, by default, Synapse v1.0 will send the confirmation email itself. If
Synapse is not configured with an SMTP server, password reset via email will be
disabled.
To configure an SMTP server for Synapse, modify the configuration section
headed ``email``, and be sure to have at least the ``smtp_host``, ``smtp_port``
and ``notif_from`` fields filled out. You may also need to set ``smtp_user``,
``smtp_pass``, and ``require_transport_security``.
If you are absolutely certain that you wish to continue using an identity
server for password resets, set ``trust_identity_server_for_password_resets`` to ``true``.
See the `sample configuration file <docs/sample_config.yaml>`_
for more details on these settings.
Upgrading to v0.99.0
====================

1
changelog.d/5221.bugfix Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
Fix race when backfilling in rooms with worker mode.

1
changelog.d/5369.bugfix Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
Fix missing logcontext warnings on shutdown.

1
changelog.d/5370.misc Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
Don't run CI build checks until sample config check has passed.

1
changelog.d/5371.feature Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
Update upgrade and installation guides ahead of 1.0.

1
changelog.d/5374.feature Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
Replace the `perspectives` configuration section with `trusted_key_servers`, and make validating the signatures on responses optional (since TLS will do this job for us).

1
changelog.d/5377.feature Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
Add ability to perform password reset via email without trusting the identity server.

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@@ -68,16 +68,14 @@ Admins should upgrade and configure a valid CA cert. Homeservers that require a
.well-known entry (see below), should retain their SRV record and use it
alongside their .well-known record.
**>= 5th March 2019 - Synapse 1.0.0 is released**
**10th June 2019 - Synapse 1.0.0 is released**
1.0.0 will land no sooner than 1 month after 0.99.0, leaving server admins one
month after 5th February to upgrade to 0.99.0 and deploy their certificates. In
1.0.0 is scheduled for release on 10th June. In
accordance with the the [S2S spec](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/server_server/r0.1.0.html)
1.0.0 will enforce certificate validity. This means that any homeserver without a
valid certificate after this point will no longer be able to federate with
1.0.0 servers.
## Configuring certificates for compatibility with Synapse 1.0.0
### If you do not currently have an SRV record
@@ -146,9 +144,9 @@ You can do this with a `.well-known` file as follows:
with Synapse 0.34 and earlier.
2. Give Synapse a certificate corresponding to the target domain
(`customer.example.net` in the above example). You can either use Synapse's
built-in [ACME support](./ACME.md) for this (via the `domain` parameter in
the `acme` section), or acquire a certificate yourself and give it to
(`customer.example.net` in the above example). You can either use Synapse's
built-in [ACME support](./ACME.md) for this (via the `domain` parameter in
the `acme` section), or acquire a certificate yourself and give it to
Synapse via `tls_certificate_path` and `tls_private_key_path`.
3. Restart Synapse to ensure the new certificate is loaded.

View File

@@ -952,12 +952,43 @@ signing_key_path: "CONFDIR/SERVERNAME.signing.key"
# The trusted servers to download signing keys from.
#
#perspectives:
# servers:
# "matrix.org":
# verify_keys:
# "ed25519:auto":
# key: "Noi6WqcDj0QmPxCNQqgezwTlBKrfqehY1u2FyWP9uYw"
# When we need to fetch a signing key, each server is tried in parallel.
#
# Normally, the connection to the key server is validated via TLS certificates.
# Additional security can be provided by configuring a `verify key`, which
# will make synapse check that the response is signed by that key.
#
# This setting supercedes an older setting named `perspectives`. The old format
# is still supported for backwards-compatibility, but it is deprecated.
#
# Options for each entry in the list include:
#
# server_name: the name of the server. required.
#
# verify_keys: an optional map from key id to base64-encoded public key.
# If specified, we will check that the response is signed by at least
# one of the given keys.
#
# accept_keys_insecurely: a boolean. Normally, if `verify_keys` is unset,
# and federation_verify_certificates is not `true`, synapse will refuse
# to start, because this would allow anyone who can spoof DNS responses
# to masquerade as the trusted key server. If you know what you are doing
# and are sure that your network environment provides a secure connection
# to the key server, you can set this to `true` to override this
# behaviour.
#
# An example configuration might look like:
#
#trusted_key_servers:
# - server_name: "my_trusted_server.example.com"
# verify_keys:
# "ed25519:auto": "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmopqr"
# - server_name: "my_other_trusted_server.example.com"
#
# The default configuration is:
#
#trusted_key_servers:
# - server_name: "matrix.org"
# Enable SAML2 for registration and login. Uses pysaml2.
@@ -1034,10 +1065,8 @@ password_config:
# Enable sending emails for notification events or expiry notices
# Defining a custom URL for Riot is only needed if email notifications
# should contain links to a self-hosted installation of Riot; when set
# the "app_name" setting is ignored.
# Enable sending emails for password resets, notification events or
# account expiry notices
#
# If your SMTP server requires authentication, the optional smtp_user &
# smtp_pass variables should be used
@@ -1045,22 +1074,64 @@ password_config:
#email:
# enable_notifs: false
# smtp_host: "localhost"
# smtp_port: 25
# smtp_port: 25 # SSL: 465, STARTTLS: 587
# smtp_user: "exampleusername"
# smtp_pass: "examplepassword"
# require_transport_security: False
# notif_from: "Your Friendly %(app)s Home Server <noreply@example.com>"
# app_name: Matrix
# # if template_dir is unset, uses the example templates that are part of
# # the Synapse distribution.
#
# # Enable email notifications by default
# notif_for_new_users: True
#
# # Defining a custom URL for Riot is only needed if email notifications
# # should contain links to a self-hosted installation of Riot; when set
# # the "app_name" setting is ignored
# riot_base_url: "http://localhost/riot"
#
# # Enable sending password reset emails via the configured, trusted
# # identity servers
# #
# # IMPORTANT! This will give a malicious or overtaken identity server
# # the ability to reset passwords for your users! Make absolutely sure
# # that you want to do this! It is strongly recommended that password
# # reset emails be sent by the homeserver instead
# #
# # If this option is set to false and SMTP options have not been
# # configured, resetting user passwords via email will be disabled
# #trust_identity_server_for_password_resets: false
#
# # Configure the time that a validation email or text message code
# # will expire after sending
# #
# # This is currently used for password resets
# #validation_token_lifetime: 1h
#
# # Template directory. All template files should be stored within this
# # directory
# #
# #template_dir: res/templates
#
# # Templates for email notifications
# #
# notif_template_html: notif_mail.html
# notif_template_text: notif_mail.txt
# # Templates for account expiry notices.
#
# # Templates for account expiry notices
# #
# expiry_template_html: notice_expiry.html
# expiry_template_text: notice_expiry.txt
# notif_for_new_users: True
# riot_base_url: "http://localhost/riot"
#
# # Templates for password reset emails sent by the homeserver
# #
# #password_reset_template_html: password_reset.html
# #password_reset_template_text: password_reset.txt
#
# # Templates for password reset success and failure pages that a user
# # will see after attempting to reset their password
# #
# #password_reset_template_success_html: password_reset_success.html
# #password_reset_template_failure_html: password_reset_failure.html
#password_providers:

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@@ -339,6 +339,15 @@ class UnsupportedRoomVersionError(SynapseError):
)
class ThreepidValidationError(SynapseError):
"""An error raised when there was a problem authorising an event."""
def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
if "errcode" not in kwargs:
kwargs["errcode"] = Codes.FORBIDDEN
super(ThreepidValidationError, self).__init__(*args, **kwargs)
class IncompatibleRoomVersionError(SynapseError):
"""A server is trying to join a room whose version it does not support.

View File

@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ class SynapseHomeServer(HomeServer):
resources.update({
"/_matrix/client/api/v1": client_resource,
"/_synapse/password_reset": client_resource,
"/_matrix/client/r0": client_resource,
"/_matrix/client/unstable": client_resource,
"/_matrix/client/v2_alpha": client_resource,

View File

@@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ class EmailConfig(Config):
else:
self.email_app_name = "Matrix"
# TODO: Rename notif_from to something more generic, or have a separate
# from for password resets, message notifications, etc?
# Currently the email section is a bit bogged down with settings for
# multiple functions. Would be good to split it out into separate
# sections and only put the common ones under email:
self.email_notif_from = email_config.get("notif_from", None)
if self.email_notif_from is not None:
# make sure it's valid
@@ -74,7 +79,28 @@ class EmailConfig(Config):
"account_validity", {},
).get("renew_at")
if self.email_enable_notifs or account_validity_renewal_enabled:
email_trust_identity_server_for_password_resets = email_config.get(
"trust_identity_server_for_password_resets", False,
)
self.email_password_reset_behaviour = (
"remote" if email_trust_identity_server_for_password_resets else "local"
)
if self.email_password_reset_behaviour == "local" and email_config == {}:
logger.warn(
"User password resets have been disabled due to lack of email config"
)
self.email_password_reset_behaviour = "off"
# Get lifetime of a validation token in milliseconds
self.email_validation_token_lifetime = self.parse_duration(
email_config.get("validation_token_lifetime", "1h")
)
if (
self.email_enable_notifs
or account_validity_renewal_enabled
or self.email_password_reset_behaviour == "local"
):
# make sure we can import the required deps
import jinja2
import bleach
@@ -82,6 +108,67 @@ class EmailConfig(Config):
jinja2
bleach
if self.email_password_reset_behaviour == "local":
required = [
"smtp_host",
"smtp_port",
"notif_from",
]
missing = []
for k in required:
if k not in email_config:
missing.append(k)
if (len(missing) > 0):
raise RuntimeError(
"email.password_reset_behaviour is set to 'local' "
"but required keys are missing: %s" %
(", ".join(["email." + k for k in missing]),)
)
# Templates for password reset emails
self.email_password_reset_template_html = email_config.get(
"password_reset_template_html", "password_reset.html",
)
self.email_password_reset_template_text = email_config.get(
"password_reset_template_text", "password_reset.txt",
)
self.email_password_reset_failure_template = email_config.get(
"password_reset_failure_template", "password_reset_failure.html",
)
# This template does not support any replaceable variables, so we will
# read it from the disk once during setup
email_password_reset_success_template = email_config.get(
"password_reset_success_template", "password_reset_success.html",
)
# Check templates exist
for f in [self.email_password_reset_template_html,
self.email_password_reset_template_text,
self.email_password_reset_failure_template,
email_password_reset_success_template]:
p = os.path.join(self.email_template_dir, f)
if not os.path.isfile(p):
raise ConfigError("Unable to find template file %s" % (p, ))
# Retrieve content of web templates
filepath = os.path.join(
self.email_template_dir,
email_password_reset_success_template,
)
self.email_password_reset_success_html_content = self.read_file(
filepath,
"email.password_reset_template_success_html",
)
if config.get("public_baseurl") is None:
raise RuntimeError(
"email.password_reset_behaviour is set to 'local' but no "
"public_baseurl is set. This is necessary to generate password "
"reset links"
)
if self.email_enable_notifs:
required = [
"smtp_host",
@@ -121,10 +208,6 @@ class EmailConfig(Config):
self.email_riot_base_url = email_config.get(
"riot_base_url", None
)
else:
self.email_enable_notifs = False
# Not much point setting defaults for the rest: it would be an
# error for them to be used.
if account_validity_renewal_enabled:
self.email_expiry_template_html = email_config.get(
@@ -141,10 +224,8 @@ class EmailConfig(Config):
def default_config(self, config_dir_path, server_name, **kwargs):
return """
# Enable sending emails for notification events or expiry notices
# Defining a custom URL for Riot is only needed if email notifications
# should contain links to a self-hosted installation of Riot; when set
# the "app_name" setting is ignored.
# Enable sending emails for password resets, notification events or
# account expiry notices
#
# If your SMTP server requires authentication, the optional smtp_user &
# smtp_pass variables should be used
@@ -152,20 +233,62 @@ class EmailConfig(Config):
#email:
# enable_notifs: false
# smtp_host: "localhost"
# smtp_port: 25
# smtp_port: 25 # SSL: 465, STARTTLS: 587
# smtp_user: "exampleusername"
# smtp_pass: "examplepassword"
# require_transport_security: False
# notif_from: "Your Friendly %(app)s Home Server <noreply@example.com>"
# app_name: Matrix
# # if template_dir is unset, uses the example templates that are part of
# # the Synapse distribution.
#
# # Enable email notifications by default
# notif_for_new_users: True
#
# # Defining a custom URL for Riot is only needed if email notifications
# # should contain links to a self-hosted installation of Riot; when set
# # the "app_name" setting is ignored
# riot_base_url: "http://localhost/riot"
#
# # Enable sending password reset emails via the configured, trusted
# # identity servers
# #
# # IMPORTANT! This will give a malicious or overtaken identity server
# # the ability to reset passwords for your users! Make absolutely sure
# # that you want to do this! It is strongly recommended that password
# # reset emails be sent by the homeserver instead
# #
# # If this option is set to false and SMTP options have not been
# # configured, resetting user passwords via email will be disabled
# #trust_identity_server_for_password_resets: false
#
# # Configure the time that a validation email or text message code
# # will expire after sending
# #
# # This is currently used for password resets
# #validation_token_lifetime: 1h
#
# # Template directory. All template files should be stored within this
# # directory
# #
# #template_dir: res/templates
#
# # Templates for email notifications
# #
# notif_template_html: notif_mail.html
# notif_template_text: notif_mail.txt
# # Templates for account expiry notices.
#
# # Templates for account expiry notices
# #
# expiry_template_html: notice_expiry.html
# expiry_template_text: notice_expiry.txt
# notif_for_new_users: True
# riot_base_url: "http://localhost/riot"
#
# # Templates for password reset emails sent by the homeserver
# #
# #password_reset_template_html: password_reset.html
# #password_reset_template_text: password_reset.txt
#
# # Templates for password reset success and failure pages that a user
# # will see after attempting to reset their password
# #
# #password_reset_template_success_html: password_reset_success.html
# #password_reset_template_failure_html: password_reset_failure.html
"""

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# Copyright 2015, 2016 OpenMarket Ltd
# Copyright 2019 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
@@ -17,6 +18,8 @@ import hashlib
import logging
import os
import attr
import jsonschema
from signedjson.key import (
NACL_ED25519,
decode_signing_key_base64,
@@ -32,11 +35,27 @@ from synapse.util.stringutils import random_string, random_string_with_symbols
from ._base import Config, ConfigError
INSECURE_NOTARY_ERROR = """\
Your server is configured to accept key server responses without signature
validation or TLS certificate validation. This is likely to be very insecure. If
you are *sure* you want to do this, set 'accept_keys_insecurely' on the
keyserver configuration."""
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class KeyConfig(Config):
@attr.s
class TrustedKeyServer(object):
# string: name of the server.
server_name = attr.ib()
# dict[str,VerifyKey]|None: map from key id to key object, or None to disable
# signature verification.
verify_keys = attr.ib(default=None)
class KeyConfig(Config):
def read_config(self, config):
# the signing key can be specified inline or in a separate file
if "signing_key" in config:
@@ -49,16 +68,27 @@ class KeyConfig(Config):
config.get("old_signing_keys", {})
)
self.key_refresh_interval = self.parse_duration(
config.get("key_refresh_interval", "1d"),
config.get("key_refresh_interval", "1d")
)
self.perspectives = self.read_perspectives(
config.get("perspectives", {}).get("servers", {
"matrix.org": {"verify_keys": {
"ed25519:auto": {
"key": "Noi6WqcDj0QmPxCNQqgezwTlBKrfqehY1u2FyWP9uYw",
}
}}
})
# if neither trusted_key_servers nor perspectives are given, use the default.
if "perspectives" not in config and "trusted_key_servers" not in config:
key_servers = [{"server_name": "matrix.org"}]
else:
key_servers = config.get("trusted_key_servers", [])
if not isinstance(key_servers, list):
raise ConfigError(
"trusted_key_servers, if given, must be a list, not a %s"
% (type(key_servers).__name__,)
)
# merge the 'perspectives' config into the 'trusted_key_servers' config.
key_servers.extend(_perspectives_to_key_servers(config))
# list of TrustedKeyServer objects
self.key_servers = list(
_parse_key_servers(key_servers, self.federation_verify_certificates)
)
self.macaroon_secret_key = config.get(
@@ -78,8 +108,9 @@ class KeyConfig(Config):
# falsification of values
self.form_secret = config.get("form_secret", None)
def default_config(self, config_dir_path, server_name, generate_secrets=False,
**kwargs):
def default_config(
self, config_dir_path, server_name, generate_secrets=False, **kwargs
):
base_key_name = os.path.join(config_dir_path, server_name)
if generate_secrets:
@@ -91,7 +122,8 @@ class KeyConfig(Config):
macaroon_secret_key = "# macaroon_secret_key: <PRIVATE STRING>"
form_secret = "# form_secret: <PRIVATE STRING>"
return """\
return (
"""\
# a secret which is used to sign access tokens. If none is specified,
# the registration_shared_secret is used, if one is given; otherwise,
# a secret key is derived from the signing key.
@@ -133,33 +165,53 @@ class KeyConfig(Config):
# The trusted servers to download signing keys from.
#
#perspectives:
# servers:
# "matrix.org":
# verify_keys:
# "ed25519:auto":
# key: "Noi6WqcDj0QmPxCNQqgezwTlBKrfqehY1u2FyWP9uYw"
""" % locals()
def read_perspectives(self, perspectives_servers):
servers = {}
for server_name, server_config in perspectives_servers.items():
for key_id, key_data in server_config["verify_keys"].items():
if is_signing_algorithm_supported(key_id):
key_base64 = key_data["key"]
key_bytes = decode_base64(key_base64)
verify_key = decode_verify_key_bytes(key_id, key_bytes)
servers.setdefault(server_name, {})[key_id] = verify_key
return servers
# When we need to fetch a signing key, each server is tried in parallel.
#
# Normally, the connection to the key server is validated via TLS certificates.
# Additional security can be provided by configuring a `verify key`, which
# will make synapse check that the response is signed by that key.
#
# This setting supercedes an older setting named `perspectives`. The old format
# is still supported for backwards-compatibility, but it is deprecated.
#
# Options for each entry in the list include:
#
# server_name: the name of the server. required.
#
# verify_keys: an optional map from key id to base64-encoded public key.
# If specified, we will check that the response is signed by at least
# one of the given keys.
#
# accept_keys_insecurely: a boolean. Normally, if `verify_keys` is unset,
# and federation_verify_certificates is not `true`, synapse will refuse
# to start, because this would allow anyone who can spoof DNS responses
# to masquerade as the trusted key server. If you know what you are doing
# and are sure that your network environment provides a secure connection
# to the key server, you can set this to `true` to override this
# behaviour.
#
# An example configuration might look like:
#
#trusted_key_servers:
# - server_name: "my_trusted_server.example.com"
# verify_keys:
# "ed25519:auto": "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmopqr"
# - server_name: "my_other_trusted_server.example.com"
#
# The default configuration is:
#
#trusted_key_servers:
# - server_name: "matrix.org"
"""
% locals()
)
def read_signing_key(self, signing_key_path):
signing_keys = self.read_file(signing_key_path, "signing_key")
try:
return read_signing_keys(signing_keys.splitlines(True))
except Exception as e:
raise ConfigError(
"Error reading signing_key: %s" % (str(e))
)
raise ConfigError("Error reading signing_key: %s" % (str(e)))
def read_old_signing_keys(self, old_signing_keys):
keys = {}
@@ -182,9 +234,7 @@ class KeyConfig(Config):
if not self.path_exists(signing_key_path):
with open(signing_key_path, "w") as signing_key_file:
key_id = "a_" + random_string(4)
write_signing_keys(
signing_key_file, (generate_signing_key(key_id),),
)
write_signing_keys(signing_key_file, (generate_signing_key(key_id),))
else:
signing_keys = self.read_file(signing_key_path, "signing_key")
if len(signing_keys.split("\n")[0].split()) == 1:
@@ -194,6 +244,106 @@ class KeyConfig(Config):
NACL_ED25519, key_id, signing_keys.split("\n")[0]
)
with open(signing_key_path, "w") as signing_key_file:
write_signing_keys(
signing_key_file, (key,),
write_signing_keys(signing_key_file, (key,))
def _perspectives_to_key_servers(config):
"""Convert old-style 'perspectives' configs into new-style 'trusted_key_servers'
Returns an iterable of entries to add to trusted_key_servers.
"""
# 'perspectives' looks like:
#
# {
# "servers": {
# "matrix.org": {
# "verify_keys": {
# "ed25519:auto": {
# "key": "Noi6WqcDj0QmPxCNQqgezwTlBKrfqehY1u2FyWP9uYw"
# }
# }
# }
# }
# }
#
# 'trusted_keys' looks like:
#
# [
# {
# "server_name": "matrix.org",
# "verify_keys": {
# "ed25519:auto": "Noi6WqcDj0QmPxCNQqgezwTlBKrfqehY1u2FyWP9uYw",
# }
# }
# ]
perspectives_servers = config.get("perspectives", {}).get("servers", {})
for server_name, server_opts in perspectives_servers.items():
trusted_key_server_entry = {"server_name": server_name}
verify_keys = server_opts.get("verify_keys")
if verify_keys is not None:
trusted_key_server_entry["verify_keys"] = {
key_id: key_data["key"] for key_id, key_data in verify_keys.items()
}
yield trusted_key_server_entry
TRUSTED_KEY_SERVERS_SCHEMA = {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-04/schema#",
"description": "schema for the trusted_key_servers setting",
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"server_name": {"type": "string"},
"verify_keys": {
"type": "object",
# each key must be a base64 string
"additionalProperties": {"type": "string"},
},
},
"required": ["server_name"],
},
}
def _parse_key_servers(key_servers, federation_verify_certificates):
try:
jsonschema.validate(key_servers, TRUSTED_KEY_SERVERS_SCHEMA)
except jsonschema.ValidationError as e:
raise ConfigError("Unable to parse 'trusted_key_servers': " + e.message)
for server in key_servers:
server_name = server["server_name"]
result = TrustedKeyServer(server_name=server_name)
verify_keys = server.get("verify_keys")
if verify_keys is not None:
result.verify_keys = {}
for key_id, key_base64 in verify_keys.items():
if not is_signing_algorithm_supported(key_id):
raise ConfigError(
"Unsupported signing algorithm on key %s for server %s in "
"trusted_key_servers" % (key_id, server_name)
)
try:
key_bytes = decode_base64(key_base64)
verify_key = decode_verify_key_bytes(key_id, key_bytes)
except Exception as e:
raise ConfigError(
"Unable to parse key %s for server %s in "
"trusted_key_servers: %s" % (key_id, server_name, e)
)
result.verify_keys[key_id] = verify_key
if (
not verify_keys
and not server.get("accept_keys_insecurely")
and not federation_verify_certificates
):
raise ConfigError(INSECURE_NOTARY_ERROR)
yield result

View File

@@ -585,25 +585,27 @@ class PerspectivesKeyFetcher(BaseV2KeyFetcher):
super(PerspectivesKeyFetcher, self).__init__(hs)
self.clock = hs.get_clock()
self.client = hs.get_http_client()
self.perspective_servers = self.config.perspectives
self.key_servers = self.config.key_servers
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def get_keys(self, keys_to_fetch):
"""see KeyFetcher.get_keys"""
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def get_key(perspective_name, perspective_keys):
def get_key(key_server):
try:
result = yield self.get_server_verify_key_v2_indirect(
keys_to_fetch, perspective_name, perspective_keys
keys_to_fetch, key_server
)
defer.returnValue(result)
except KeyLookupError as e:
logger.warning("Key lookup failed from %r: %s", perspective_name, e)
logger.warning(
"Key lookup failed from %r: %s", key_server.server_name, e
)
except Exception as e:
logger.exception(
"Unable to get key from %r: %s %s",
perspective_name,
key_server.server_name,
type(e).__name__,
str(e),
)
@@ -613,8 +615,8 @@ class PerspectivesKeyFetcher(BaseV2KeyFetcher):
results = yield logcontext.make_deferred_yieldable(
defer.gatherResults(
[
run_in_background(get_key, p_name, p_keys)
for p_name, p_keys in self.perspective_servers.items()
run_in_background(get_key, server)
for server in self.key_servers
],
consumeErrors=True,
).addErrback(unwrapFirstError)
@@ -629,17 +631,15 @@ class PerspectivesKeyFetcher(BaseV2KeyFetcher):
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def get_server_verify_key_v2_indirect(
self, keys_to_fetch, perspective_name, perspective_keys
self, keys_to_fetch, key_server
):
"""
Args:
keys_to_fetch (dict[str, dict[str, int]]):
the keys to be fetched. server_name -> key_id -> min_valid_ts
perspective_name (str): name of the notary server to query for the keys
perspective_keys (dict[str, VerifyKey]): map of key_id->key for the
notary server
key_server (synapse.config.key.TrustedKeyServer): notary server to query for
the keys
Returns:
Deferred[dict[str, dict[str, synapse.storage.keys.FetchKeyResult]]]: map
@@ -649,6 +649,7 @@ class PerspectivesKeyFetcher(BaseV2KeyFetcher):
KeyLookupError if there was an error processing the entire response from
the server
"""
perspective_name = key_server.server_name
logger.info(
"Requesting keys %s from notary server %s",
keys_to_fetch.items(),
@@ -689,11 +690,13 @@ class PerspectivesKeyFetcher(BaseV2KeyFetcher):
)
try:
processed_response = yield self._process_perspectives_response(
perspective_name,
perspective_keys,
self._validate_perspectives_response(
key_server,
response,
time_added_ms=time_now_ms,
)
processed_response = yield self.process_v2_response(
perspective_name, response, time_added_ms=time_now_ms
)
except KeyLookupError as e:
logger.warning(
@@ -717,28 +720,24 @@ class PerspectivesKeyFetcher(BaseV2KeyFetcher):
defer.returnValue(keys)
def _process_perspectives_response(
self, perspective_name, perspective_keys, response, time_added_ms
def _validate_perspectives_response(
self, key_server, response,
):
"""Parse a 'Server Keys' structure from the result of a /key/query request
Checks that the entry is correctly signed by the perspectives server, and then
passes over to process_v2_response
"""Optionally check the signature on the result of a /key/query request
Args:
perspective_name (str): the name of the notary server that produced this
result
perspective_keys (dict[str, VerifyKey]): map of key_id->key for the
notary server
key_server (synapse.config.key.TrustedKeyServer): the notary server that
produced this result
response (dict): the json-decoded Server Keys response object
time_added_ms (int): the timestamp to record in server_keys_json
Returns:
Deferred[dict[str, FetchKeyResult]]: map from key_id to result object
"""
perspective_name = key_server.server_name
perspective_keys = key_server.verify_keys
if perspective_keys is None:
# signature checking is disabled on this server
return
if (
u"signatures" not in response
or perspective_name not in response[u"signatures"]
@@ -751,6 +750,13 @@ class PerspectivesKeyFetcher(BaseV2KeyFetcher):
verify_signed_json(response, perspective_name, perspective_keys[key_id])
verified = True
if perspective_name == "matrix.org" and key_id == "ed25519:auto":
logger.warning(
"Trusting trusted_key_server responses signed by the "
"compromised matrix.org signing key 'ed25519:auto'. "
"This is a placebo."
)
if not verified:
raise KeyLookupError(
"Response not signed with a known key: signed with: %r, known keys: %r"
@@ -760,10 +766,6 @@ class PerspectivesKeyFetcher(BaseV2KeyFetcher):
)
)
return self.process_v2_response(
perspective_name, response, time_added_ms=time_added_ms
)
class ServerKeyFetcher(BaseV2KeyFetcher):
"""KeyFetcher impl which fetches keys from the origin servers"""

View File

@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
defer.returnValue(params)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def check_auth(self, flows, clientdict, clientip):
def check_auth(self, flows, clientdict, clientip, password_servlet=False):
"""
Takes a dictionary sent by the client in the login / registration
protocol and handles the User-Interactive Auth flow.
@@ -186,6 +186,16 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
clientip (str): The IP address of the client.
password_servlet (bool): Whether the request originated from
PasswordRestServlet.
XXX: This is a temporary hack to distinguish between checking
for threepid validations locally (in the case of password
resets) and using the identity server (in the case of binding
a 3PID during registration). Once we start using the
homeserver for both tasks, this distinction will no longer be
necessary.
Returns:
defer.Deferred[dict, dict, str]: a deferred tuple of
(creds, params, session_id).
@@ -241,7 +251,9 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
if 'type' in authdict:
login_type = authdict['type']
try:
result = yield self._check_auth_dict(authdict, clientip)
result = yield self._check_auth_dict(
authdict, clientip, password_servlet=password_servlet,
)
if result:
creds[login_type] = result
self._save_session(session)
@@ -351,7 +363,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
return sess.setdefault('serverdict', {}).get(key, default)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _check_auth_dict(self, authdict, clientip):
def _check_auth_dict(self, authdict, clientip, password_servlet=False):
"""Attempt to validate the auth dict provided by a client
Args:
@@ -369,7 +381,13 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
login_type = authdict['type']
checker = self.checkers.get(login_type)
if checker is not None:
res = yield checker(authdict, clientip)
# XXX: Temporary workaround for having Synapse handle password resets
# See AuthHandler.check_auth for further details
res = yield checker(
authdict,
clientip=clientip,
password_servlet=password_servlet,
)
defer.returnValue(res)
# build a v1-login-style dict out of the authdict and fall back to the
@@ -383,7 +401,7 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
defer.returnValue(canonical_id)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _check_recaptcha(self, authdict, clientip):
def _check_recaptcha(self, authdict, clientip, **kwargs):
try:
user_response = authdict["response"]
except KeyError:
@@ -429,20 +447,20 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
defer.returnValue(True)
raise LoginError(401, "", errcode=Codes.UNAUTHORIZED)
def _check_email_identity(self, authdict, _):
return self._check_threepid('email', authdict)
def _check_email_identity(self, authdict, **kwargs):
return self._check_threepid('email', authdict, **kwargs)
def _check_msisdn(self, authdict, _):
def _check_msisdn(self, authdict, **kwargs):
return self._check_threepid('msisdn', authdict)
def _check_dummy_auth(self, authdict, _):
def _check_dummy_auth(self, authdict, **kwargs):
return defer.succeed(True)
def _check_terms_auth(self, authdict, _):
def _check_terms_auth(self, authdict, **kwargs):
return defer.succeed(True)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _check_threepid(self, medium, authdict):
def _check_threepid(self, medium, authdict, password_servlet=False, **kwargs):
if 'threepid_creds' not in authdict:
raise LoginError(400, "Missing threepid_creds", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
@@ -451,7 +469,29 @@ class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
identity_handler = self.hs.get_handlers().identity_handler
logger.info("Getting validated threepid. threepidcreds: %r", (threepid_creds,))
threepid = yield identity_handler.threepid_from_creds(threepid_creds)
if (
not password_servlet
or self.hs.config.email_password_reset_behaviour == "remote"
):
threepid = yield identity_handler.threepid_from_creds(threepid_creds)
elif self.hs.config.email_password_reset_behaviour == "local":
row = yield self.store.get_threepid_validation_session(
medium,
threepid_creds["client_secret"],
sid=threepid_creds["sid"],
)
threepid = {
"medium": row["medium"],
"address": row["address"],
"validated_at": row["validated_at"],
} if row else None
if row:
# Valid threepid returned, delete from the db
yield self.store.delete_threepid_session(threepid_creds["sid"])
else:
raise SynapseError(400, "Password resets are not enabled on this homeserver")
if not threepid:
raise LoginError(401, "", errcode=Codes.UNAUTHORIZED)

View File

@@ -247,7 +247,14 @@ class IdentityHandler(BaseHandler):
defer.returnValue(changed)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def requestEmailToken(self, id_server, email, client_secret, send_attempt, **kwargs):
def requestEmailToken(
self,
id_server,
email,
client_secret,
send_attempt,
next_link=None,
):
if not self._should_trust_id_server(id_server):
raise SynapseError(
400, "Untrusted ID server '%s'" % id_server,
@@ -259,7 +266,9 @@ class IdentityHandler(BaseHandler):
'client_secret': client_secret,
'send_attempt': send_attempt,
}
params.update(kwargs)
if next_link:
params.update({'next_link': next_link})
try:
data = yield self.http_client.post_json_get_json(

View File

@@ -158,7 +158,13 @@ class PresenceHandler(object):
# have not yet been persisted
self.unpersisted_users_changes = set()
hs.get_reactor().addSystemEventTrigger("before", "shutdown", self._on_shutdown)
hs.get_reactor().addSystemEventTrigger(
"before",
"shutdown",
run_as_background_process,
"presence.on_shutdown",
self._on_shutdown,
)
self.serial_to_user = {}
self._next_serial = 1

View File

@@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ ALLOWED_ATTRS = {
class Mailer(object):
def __init__(self, hs, app_name, notif_template_html, notif_template_text):
def __init__(self, hs, app_name, template_html, template_text):
self.hs = hs
self.notif_template_html = notif_template_html
self.notif_template_text = notif_template_text
self.template_html = template_html
self.template_text = template_text
self.sendmail = self.hs.get_sendmail()
self.store = self.hs.get_datastore()
@@ -93,22 +93,49 @@ class Mailer(object):
logger.info("Created Mailer for app_name %s" % app_name)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def send_password_reset_mail(
self,
email_address,
token,
client_secret,
sid,
):
"""Send an email with a password reset link to a user
Args:
email_address (str): Email address we're sending the password
reset to
token (str): Unique token generated by the server to verify
password reset email was received
client_secret (str): Unique token generated by the client to
group together multiple email sending attempts
sid (str): The generated session ID
"""
if email.utils.parseaddr(email_address)[1] == '':
raise RuntimeError("Invalid 'to' email address")
link = (
self.hs.config.public_baseurl +
"_synapse/password_reset/email/submit_token"
"?token=%s&client_secret=%s&sid=%s" %
(token, client_secret, sid)
)
template_vars = {
"link": link,
}
yield self.send_email(
email_address,
"[%s] Password Reset Email" % self.hs.config.server_name,
template_vars,
)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def send_notification_mail(self, app_id, user_id, email_address,
push_actions, reason):
try:
from_string = self.hs.config.email_notif_from % {
"app": self.app_name
}
except TypeError:
from_string = self.hs.config.email_notif_from
raw_from = email.utils.parseaddr(from_string)[1]
raw_to = email.utils.parseaddr(email_address)[1]
if raw_to == '':
raise RuntimeError("Invalid 'to' address")
"""Send email regarding a user's room notifications"""
rooms_in_order = deduped_ordered_list(
[pa['room_id'] for pa in push_actions]
)
@@ -176,14 +203,36 @@ class Mailer(object):
"reason": reason,
}
html_text = self.notif_template_html.render(**template_vars)
yield self.send_email(
email_address,
"[%s] %s" % (self.app_name, summary_text),
template_vars,
)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def send_email(self, email_address, subject, template_vars):
"""Send an email with the given information and template text"""
try:
from_string = self.hs.config.email_notif_from % {
"app": self.app_name
}
except TypeError:
from_string = self.hs.config.email_notif_from
raw_from = email.utils.parseaddr(from_string)[1]
raw_to = email.utils.parseaddr(email_address)[1]
if raw_to == '':
raise RuntimeError("Invalid 'to' address")
html_text = self.template_html.render(**template_vars)
html_part = MIMEText(html_text, "html", "utf8")
plain_text = self.notif_template_text.render(**template_vars)
plain_text = self.template_text.render(**template_vars)
text_part = MIMEText(plain_text, "plain", "utf8")
multipart_msg = MIMEMultipart('alternative')
multipart_msg['Subject'] = "[%s] %s" % (self.app_name, summary_text)
multipart_msg['Subject'] = subject
multipart_msg['From'] = from_string
multipart_msg['To'] = email_address
multipart_msg['Date'] = email.utils.formatdate()

View File

@@ -70,8 +70,8 @@ class PusherFactory(object):
mailer = Mailer(
hs=self.hs,
app_name=app_name,
notif_template_html=self.notif_template_html,
notif_template_text=self.notif_template_text,
template_html=self.notif_template_html,
template_text=self.notif_template_text,
)
self.mailers[app_name] = mailer
return EmailPusher(self.hs, pusherdict, mailer)

View File

@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ REQUIREMENTS = [
]
CONDITIONAL_REQUIREMENTS = {
"email.enable_notifs": ["Jinja2>=2.9", "bleach>=1.4.2"],
"email": ["Jinja2>=2.9", "bleach>=1.4.2"],
"matrix-synapse-ldap3": ["matrix-synapse-ldap3>=0.1"],
# we use execute_batch, which arrived in psycopg 2.7.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
<html>
<body>
<p>A password reset request has been received for your Matrix account. If this was you, please click the link below to confirm resetting your password:</p>
<a href="{{ link }}">{{ link }}</a>
<p>If this was not you, please disregard this email and contact your server administrator. Thank you.</p>
</body>
</html>

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
A password reset request has been received for your Matrix account. If this
was you, please click the link below to confirm resetting your password:
{{ link }}
If this was not you, please disregard this email and contact your server
administrator. Thank you.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
<html>
<head></head>
<body>
<p>{{ failure_reason }}. Your password has not been reset.</p>
</body>
</html>

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
<html>
<head></head>
<body>
<p>Your password was successfully reset. You may now close this window.</p>
</body>
</html>

View File

@@ -15,19 +15,25 @@
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
import logging
import re
from six.moves import http_client
import jinja2
from twisted.internet import defer
from synapse.api.constants import LoginType
from synapse.api.errors import Codes, SynapseError
from synapse.api.errors import Codes, SynapseError, ThreepidValidationError
from synapse.http.server import finish_request
from synapse.http.servlet import (
RestServlet,
assert_params_in_dict,
parse_json_object_from_request,
parse_string,
)
from synapse.util.msisdn import phone_number_to_msisdn
from synapse.util.stringutils import random_string
from synapse.util.threepids import check_3pid_allowed
from ._base import client_patterns, interactive_auth_handler
@@ -41,17 +47,42 @@ class EmailPasswordRequestTokenRestServlet(RestServlet):
def __init__(self, hs):
super(EmailPasswordRequestTokenRestServlet, self).__init__()
self.hs = hs
self.datastore = hs.get_datastore()
self.config = hs.config
self.identity_handler = hs.get_handlers().identity_handler
if self.config.email_password_reset_behaviour == "local":
from synapse.push.mailer import Mailer, load_jinja2_templates
templates = load_jinja2_templates(
config=hs.config,
template_html_name=hs.config.email_password_reset_template_html,
template_text_name=hs.config.email_password_reset_template_text,
)
self.mailer = Mailer(
hs=self.hs,
app_name=self.config.email_app_name,
template_html=templates[0],
template_text=templates[1],
)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def on_POST(self, request):
if self.config.email_password_reset_behaviour == "off":
raise SynapseError(400, "Password resets have been disabled on this server")
body = parse_json_object_from_request(request)
assert_params_in_dict(body, [
'id_server', 'client_secret', 'email', 'send_attempt'
'client_secret', 'email', 'send_attempt'
])
if not check_3pid_allowed(self.hs, "email", body['email']):
# Extract params from body
client_secret = body["client_secret"]
email = body["email"]
send_attempt = body["send_attempt"]
next_link = body.get("next_link") # Optional param
if not check_3pid_allowed(self.hs, "email", email):
raise SynapseError(
403,
"Your email domain is not authorized on this server",
@@ -59,15 +90,100 @@ class EmailPasswordRequestTokenRestServlet(RestServlet):
)
existingUid = yield self.hs.get_datastore().get_user_id_by_threepid(
'email', body['email']
'email', email,
)
if existingUid is None:
raise SynapseError(400, "Email not found", Codes.THREEPID_NOT_FOUND)
ret = yield self.identity_handler.requestEmailToken(**body)
if self.config.email_password_reset_behaviour == "remote":
if 'id_server' not in body:
raise SynapseError(400, "Missing 'id_server' param in body")
# Have the identity server handle the password reset flow
ret = yield self.identity_handler.requestEmailToken(
body["id_server"], email, client_secret, send_attempt, next_link,
)
else:
# Send password reset emails from Synapse
sid = yield self.send_password_reset(
email, client_secret, send_attempt, next_link,
)
# Wrap the session id in a JSON object
ret = {"sid": sid}
defer.returnValue((200, ret))
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def send_password_reset(
self,
email,
client_secret,
send_attempt,
next_link=None,
):
"""Send a password reset email
Args:
email (str): The user's email address
client_secret (str): The provided client secret
send_attempt (int): Which send attempt this is
Returns:
The new session_id upon success
Raises:
SynapseError is an error occurred when sending the email
"""
# Check that this email/client_secret/send_attempt combo is new or
# greater than what we've seen previously
session = yield self.datastore.get_threepid_validation_session(
"email", client_secret, address=email, validated=False,
)
# Check to see if a session already exists and that it is not yet
# marked as validated
if session and session.get("validated_at") is None:
session_id = session['session_id']
last_send_attempt = session['last_send_attempt']
# Check that the send_attempt is higher than previous attempts
if send_attempt <= last_send_attempt:
# If not, just return a success without sending an email
defer.returnValue(session_id)
else:
# An non-validated session does not exist yet.
# Generate a session id
session_id = random_string(16)
# Generate a new validation token
token = random_string(32)
# Send the mail with the link containing the token, client_secret
# and session_id
try:
yield self.mailer.send_password_reset_mail(
email, token, client_secret, session_id,
)
except Exception:
logger.exception(
"Error sending a password reset email to %s", email,
)
raise SynapseError(
500, "An error was encountered when sending the password reset email"
)
token_expires = (self.hs.clock.time_msec() +
self.config.email_validation_token_lifetime)
yield self.datastore.start_or_continue_validation_session(
"email", email, session_id, client_secret, send_attempt,
next_link, token, token_expires,
)
defer.returnValue(session_id)
class MsisdnPasswordRequestTokenRestServlet(RestServlet):
PATTERNS = client_patterns("/account/password/msisdn/requestToken$")
@@ -80,6 +196,9 @@ class MsisdnPasswordRequestTokenRestServlet(RestServlet):
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def on_POST(self, request):
if not self.config.email_password_reset_behaviour == "off":
raise SynapseError(400, "Password resets have been disabled on this server")
body = parse_json_object_from_request(request)
assert_params_in_dict(body, [
@@ -107,6 +226,118 @@ class MsisdnPasswordRequestTokenRestServlet(RestServlet):
defer.returnValue((200, ret))
class PasswordResetSubmitTokenServlet(RestServlet):
"""Handles 3PID validation token submission"""
PATTERNS = [
re.compile("^/_synapse/password_reset/(?P<medium>[^/]*)/submit_token/*$"),
]
def __init__(self, hs):
"""
Args:
hs (synapse.server.HomeServer): server
"""
super(PasswordResetSubmitTokenServlet, self).__init__()
self.hs = hs
self.auth = hs.get_auth()
self.config = hs.config
self.clock = hs.get_clock()
self.datastore = hs.get_datastore()
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def on_GET(self, request, medium):
if medium != "email":
raise SynapseError(
400,
"This medium is currently not supported for password resets",
)
sid = parse_string(request, "sid")
client_secret = parse_string(request, "client_secret")
token = parse_string(request, "token")
# Attempt to validate a 3PID sesssion
try:
# Mark the session as valid
next_link = yield self.datastore.validate_threepid_session(
sid,
client_secret,
token,
self.clock.time_msec(),
)
# Perform a 302 redirect if next_link is set
if next_link:
if next_link.startswith("file:///"):
logger.warn(
"Not redirecting to next_link as it is a local file: address"
)
else:
request.setResponseCode(302)
request.setHeader("Location", next_link)
finish_request(request)
defer.returnValue(None)
# Otherwise show the success template
html = self.config.email_password_reset_success_html_content
request.setResponseCode(200)
except ThreepidValidationError as e:
# Show a failure page with a reason
html = self.load_jinja2_template(
self.config.email_template_dir,
self.config.email_password_reset_failure_template,
template_vars={
"failure_reason": e.msg,
}
)
request.setResponseCode(e.code)
request.write(html.encode('utf-8'))
finish_request(request)
defer.returnValue(None)
def load_jinja2_template(self, template_dir, template_filename, template_vars):
"""Loads a jinja2 template with variables to insert
Args:
template_dir (str): The directory where templates are stored
template_filename (str): The name of the template in the template_dir
template_vars (Dict): Dictionary of keys in the template
alongside their values to insert
Returns:
str containing the contents of the rendered template
"""
loader = jinja2.FileSystemLoader(template_dir)
env = jinja2.Environment(loader=loader)
template = env.get_template(template_filename)
return template.render(**template_vars)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def on_POST(self, request, medium):
if medium != "email":
raise SynapseError(
400,
"This medium is currently not supported for password resets",
)
body = parse_json_object_from_request(request)
assert_params_in_dict(body, [
'sid', 'client_secret', 'token',
])
valid, _ = yield self.datastore.validate_threepid_validation_token(
body['sid'],
body['client_secret'],
body['token'],
self.clock.time_msec(),
)
response_code = 200 if valid else 400
defer.returnValue((response_code, {"success": valid}))
class PasswordRestServlet(RestServlet):
PATTERNS = client_patterns("/account/password$")
@@ -144,6 +375,7 @@ class PasswordRestServlet(RestServlet):
result, params, _ = yield self.auth_handler.check_auth(
[[LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY], [LoginType.MSISDN]],
body, self.hs.get_ip_from_request(request),
password_servlet=True,
)
if LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY in result:
@@ -417,6 +649,7 @@ class WhoamiRestServlet(RestServlet):
def register_servlets(hs, http_server):
EmailPasswordRequestTokenRestServlet(hs).register(http_server)
MsisdnPasswordRequestTokenRestServlet(hs).register(http_server)
PasswordResetSubmitTokenServlet(hs).register(http_server)
PasswordRestServlet(hs).register(http_server)
DeactivateAccountRestServlet(hs).register(http_server)
EmailThreepidRequestTokenRestServlet(hs).register(http_server)

View File

@@ -588,6 +588,10 @@ class SQLBaseStore(object):
Args:
table : string giving the table name
values : dict of new column names and values for them
or_ignore : bool stating whether an exception should be raised
when a conflicting row already exists. If True, False will be
returned by the function instead
desc : string giving a description of the transaction
Returns:
bool: Whether the row was inserted or not. Only useful when
@@ -1228,8 +1232,8 @@ class SQLBaseStore(object):
)
txn.execute(select_sql, list(keyvalues.values()))
row = txn.fetchone()
if not row:
if allow_none:
return None

View File

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Remember to update this number every time a change is made to database
# schema files, so the users will be informed on server restarts.
SCHEMA_VERSION = 54
SCHEMA_VERSION = 55
dir_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.dirname(__file__))

View File

@@ -17,17 +17,20 @@
import re
from six import iterkeys
from six.moves import range
from twisted.internet import defer
from synapse.api.constants import UserTypes
from synapse.api.errors import Codes, StoreError
from synapse.api.errors import Codes, StoreError, ThreepidValidationError
from synapse.storage import background_updates
from synapse.storage._base import SQLBaseStore
from synapse.types import UserID
from synapse.util.caches.descriptors import cached, cachedInlineCallbacks
THIRTY_MINUTES_IN_MS = 30 * 60 * 1000
class RegistrationWorkerStore(SQLBaseStore):
def __init__(self, db_conn, hs):
@@ -422,7 +425,7 @@ class RegistrationWorkerStore(SQLBaseStore):
defer.returnValue(None)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def get_user_id_by_threepid(self, medium, address):
def get_user_id_by_threepid(self, medium, address, require_verified=False):
"""Returns user id from threepid
Args:
@@ -595,6 +598,11 @@ class RegistrationStore(
"user_threepids_grandfather", self._bg_user_threepids_grandfather,
)
# Create a background job for culling expired 3PID validity tokens
hs.get_clock().looping_call(
self.cull_expired_threepid_validation_tokens, THIRTY_MINUTES_IN_MS,
)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def add_access_token_to_user(self, user_id, token, device_id=None):
"""Adds an access token for the given user.
@@ -963,7 +971,6 @@ class RegistrationStore(
We do this by grandfathering in existing user threepids assuming that
they used one of the server configured trusted identity servers.
"""
id_servers = set(self.config.trusted_third_party_id_servers)
def _bg_user_threepids_grandfather_txn(txn):
@@ -984,3 +991,280 @@ class RegistrationStore(
yield self._end_background_update("user_threepids_grandfather")
defer.returnValue(1)
def get_threepid_validation_session(
self,
medium,
client_secret,
address=None,
sid=None,
validated=None,
):
"""Gets a session_id and last_send_attempt (if available) for a
client_secret/medium/(address|session_id) combo
Args:
medium (str|None): The medium of the 3PID
address (str|None): The address of the 3PID
sid (str|None): The ID of the validation session
client_secret (str|None): A unique string provided by the client to
help identify this validation attempt
validated (bool|None): Whether sessions should be filtered by
whether they have been validated already or not. None to
perform no filtering
Returns:
deferred {str, int}|None: A dict containing the
latest session_id and send_attempt count for this 3PID.
Otherwise None if there hasn't been a previous attempt
"""
keyvalues = {
"medium": medium,
"client_secret": client_secret,
}
if address:
keyvalues["address"] = address
if sid:
keyvalues["session_id"] = sid
assert(address or sid)
def get_threepid_validation_session_txn(txn):
sql = """
SELECT address, session_id, medium, client_secret,
last_send_attempt, validated_at
FROM threepid_validation_session WHERE %s
""" % (" AND ".join("%s = ?" % k for k in iterkeys(keyvalues)),)
if validated is not None:
sql += " AND validated_at IS " + ("NOT NULL" if validated else "NULL")
sql += " LIMIT 1"
txn.execute(sql, list(keyvalues.values()))
rows = self.cursor_to_dict(txn)
if not rows:
return None
return rows[0]
return self.runInteraction(
"get_threepid_validation_session",
get_threepid_validation_session_txn,
)
def validate_threepid_session(
self,
session_id,
client_secret,
token,
current_ts,
):
"""Attempt to validate a threepid session using a token
Args:
session_id (str): The id of a validation session
client_secret (str): A unique string provided by the client to
help identify this validation attempt
token (str): A validation token
current_ts (int): The current unix time in milliseconds. Used for
checking token expiry status
Returns:
deferred str|None: A str representing a link to redirect the user
to if there is one.
"""
# Insert everything into a transaction in order to run atomically
def validate_threepid_session_txn(txn):
row = self._simple_select_one_txn(
txn,
table="threepid_validation_session",
keyvalues={"session_id": session_id},
retcols=["client_secret", "validated_at"],
allow_none=True,
)
if not row:
raise ThreepidValidationError(400, "Unknown session_id")
retrieved_client_secret = row["client_secret"]
validated_at = row["validated_at"]
if retrieved_client_secret != client_secret:
raise ThreepidValidationError(
400, "This client_secret does not match the provided session_id",
)
row = self._simple_select_one_txn(
txn,
table="threepid_validation_token",
keyvalues={"session_id": session_id, "token": token},
retcols=["expires", "next_link"],
allow_none=True,
)
if not row:
raise ThreepidValidationError(
400, "Validation token not found or has expired",
)
expires = row["expires"]
next_link = row["next_link"]
# If the session is already validated, no need to revalidate
if validated_at:
return next_link
if expires <= current_ts:
raise ThreepidValidationError(
400, "This token has expired. Please request a new one",
)
# Looks good. Validate the session
self._simple_update_txn(
txn,
table="threepid_validation_session",
keyvalues={"session_id": session_id},
updatevalues={"validated_at": self.clock.time_msec()},
)
return next_link
# Return next_link if it exists
return self.runInteraction(
"validate_threepid_session_txn",
validate_threepid_session_txn,
)
def upsert_threepid_validation_session(
self,
medium,
address,
client_secret,
send_attempt,
session_id,
validated_at=None,
):
"""Upsert a threepid validation session
Args:
medium (str): The medium of the 3PID
address (str): The address of the 3PID
client_secret (str): A unique string provided by the client to
help identify this validation attempt
send_attempt (int): The latest send_attempt on this session
session_id (str): The id of this validation session
validated_at (int|None): The unix timestamp in milliseconds of
when the session was marked as valid
"""
insertion_values = {
"medium": medium,
"address": address,
"client_secret": client_secret,
}
if validated_at:
insertion_values["validated_at"] = validated_at
return self._simple_upsert(
table="threepid_validation_session",
keyvalues={"session_id": session_id},
values={"last_send_attempt": send_attempt},
insertion_values=insertion_values,
desc="upsert_threepid_validation_session",
)
def start_or_continue_validation_session(
self,
medium,
address,
session_id,
client_secret,
send_attempt,
next_link,
token,
token_expires,
):
"""Creates a new threepid validation session if it does not already
exist and associates a new validation token with it
Args:
medium (str): The medium of the 3PID
address (str): The address of the 3PID
session_id (str): The id of this validation session
client_secret (str): A unique string provided by the client to
help identify this validation attempt
send_attempt (int): The latest send_attempt on this session
next_link (str|None): The link to redirect the user to upon
successful validation
token (str): The validation token
token_expires (int): The timestamp for which after the token
will no longer be valid
"""
def start_or_continue_validation_session_txn(txn):
# Create or update a validation session
self._simple_upsert_txn(
txn,
table="threepid_validation_session",
keyvalues={"session_id": session_id},
values={"last_send_attempt": send_attempt},
insertion_values={
"medium": medium,
"address": address,
"client_secret": client_secret,
},
)
# Create a new validation token with this session ID
self._simple_insert_txn(
txn,
table="threepid_validation_token",
values={
"session_id": session_id,
"token": token,
"next_link": next_link,
"expires": token_expires,
},
)
return self.runInteraction(
"start_or_continue_validation_session",
start_or_continue_validation_session_txn,
)
def cull_expired_threepid_validation_tokens(self):
"""Remove threepid validation tokens with expiry dates that have passed"""
def cull_expired_threepid_validation_tokens_txn(txn, ts):
sql = """
DELETE FROM threepid_validation_token WHERE
expires < ?
"""
return txn.execute(sql, (ts,))
return self.runInteraction(
"cull_expired_threepid_validation_tokens",
cull_expired_threepid_validation_tokens_txn,
self.clock.time_msec(),
)
def delete_threepid_session(self, session_id):
"""Removes a threepid validation session from the database. This can
be done after validation has been performed and whatever action was
waiting on it has been carried out
Args:
session_id (str): The ID of the session to delete
"""
def delete_threepid_session_txn(txn):
self._simple_delete_txn(
txn,
table="threepid_validation_token",
keyvalues={"session_id": session_id},
)
self._simple_delete_txn(
txn,
table="threepid_validation_session",
keyvalues={"session_id": session_id},
)
return self.runInteraction(
"delete_threepid_session",
delete_threepid_session_txn,
)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
/* Copyright 2019 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS threepid_validation_session (
session_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
medium TEXT NOT NULL,
address TEXT NOT NULL,
client_secret TEXT NOT NULL,
last_send_attempt BIGINT NOT NULL,
validated_at BIGINT
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS threepid_validation_token (
token TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
session_id TEXT NOT NULL,
next_link TEXT,
expires BIGINT NOT NULL
);
CREATE INDEX threepid_validation_token_session_id ON threepid_validation_token(session_id);

View File

@@ -592,8 +592,18 @@ class StreamWorkerStore(EventsWorkerStore, SQLBaseStore):
)
def get_max_topological_token(self, room_id, stream_key):
"""Get the max topological token in a room before the given stream
ordering.
Args:
room_id (str)
stream_key (int)
Returns:
Deferred[int]
"""
sql = (
"SELECT max(topological_ordering) FROM events"
"SELECT coalesce(max(topological_ordering), 0) FROM events"
" WHERE room_id = ? AND stream_ordering < ?"
)
return self._execute(

View File

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ from mock import Mock
import canonicaljson
import signedjson.key
import signedjson.sign
from signedjson.key import get_verify_key
from signedjson.key import encode_verify_key_base64, get_verify_key
from twisted.internet import defer
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ class MockPerspectiveServer(object):
def get_verify_keys(self):
vk = signedjson.key.get_verify_key(self.key)
return {"%s:%s" % (vk.alg, vk.version): vk}
return {"%s:%s" % (vk.alg, vk.version): encode_verify_key_base64(vk)}
def get_signed_key(self, server_name, verify_key):
key_id = "%s:%s" % (verify_key.alg, verify_key.version)
@@ -48,9 +48,7 @@ class MockPerspectiveServer(object):
"server_name": server_name,
"old_verify_keys": {},
"valid_until_ts": time.time() * 1000 + 3600,
"verify_keys": {
key_id: {"key": signedjson.key.encode_verify_key_base64(verify_key)}
},
"verify_keys": {key_id: {"key": encode_verify_key_base64(verify_key)}},
}
self.sign_response(res)
return res
@@ -63,10 +61,18 @@ class KeyringTestCase(unittest.HomeserverTestCase):
def make_homeserver(self, reactor, clock):
self.mock_perspective_server = MockPerspectiveServer()
self.http_client = Mock()
hs = self.setup_test_homeserver(handlers=None, http_client=self.http_client)
keys = self.mock_perspective_server.get_verify_keys()
hs.config.perspectives = {self.mock_perspective_server.server_name: keys}
return hs
config = self.default_config()
config["trusted_key_servers"] = [
{
"server_name": self.mock_perspective_server.server_name,
"verify_keys": self.mock_perspective_server.get_verify_keys(),
}
]
return self.setup_test_homeserver(
handlers=None, http_client=self.http_client, config=config
)
def check_context(self, _, expected):
self.assertEquals(
@@ -371,10 +377,18 @@ class PerspectivesKeyFetcherTestCase(unittest.HomeserverTestCase):
def make_homeserver(self, reactor, clock):
self.mock_perspective_server = MockPerspectiveServer()
self.http_client = Mock()
hs = self.setup_test_homeserver(handlers=None, http_client=self.http_client)
keys = self.mock_perspective_server.get_verify_keys()
hs.config.perspectives = {self.mock_perspective_server.server_name: keys}
return hs
config = self.default_config()
config["trusted_key_servers"] = [
{
"server_name": self.mock_perspective_server.server_name,
"verify_keys": self.mock_perspective_server.get_verify_keys(),
}
]
return self.setup_test_homeserver(
handlers=None, http_client=self.http_client, config=config
)
def test_get_keys_from_perspectives(self):
# arbitrarily advance the clock a bit
@@ -439,8 +453,7 @@ class PerspectivesKeyFetcherTestCase(unittest.HomeserverTestCase):
self.assertEqual(res["ts_valid_until_ms"], VALID_UNTIL_TS)
self.assertEqual(
bytes(res["key_json"]),
canonicaljson.encode_canonical_json(response),
bytes(res["key_json"]), canonicaljson.encode_canonical_json(response)
)
def test_invalid_perspectives_responses(self):

View File

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ class MatrixFederationAgentTests(TestCase):
# present will not be trusted. We should do better here, though.
config_dict = default_config("test", parse=False)
config_dict["federation_verify_certificates"] = False
config_dict["trusted_key_servers"] = []
config = HomeServerConfig()
config.parse_config_dict(config_dict)

View File

@@ -132,7 +132,6 @@ def default_config(name, parse=False):
"password_providers": [],
"worker_replication_url": "",
"worker_app": None,
"email_enable_notifs": False,
"block_non_admin_invites": False,
"federation_domain_whitelist": None,
"filter_timeline_limit": 5000,