diff --git a/contrib/systemd-with-workers/override-hardened-workers.conf b/contrib/systemd-with-workers/override-hardened-workers.conf
deleted file mode 100644
index b2fa3ae7c5..0000000000
--- a/contrib/systemd-with-workers/override-hardened-workers.conf
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-[Service]
-# The following directives give the synapse service R/W access to:
-# - /run/matrix-synapse
-# - /var/lib/matrix-synapse
-# - /var/log/matrix-synapse
-
-RuntimeDirectory=matrix-synapse
-StateDirectory=matrix-synapse
-LogsDirectory=matrix-synapse
-
-######################
-## Security Sandbox ##
-######################
-
-# Make sure that the service has its own unshared tmpfs at /tmp and that it
-# cannot see or change any real devices
-PrivateTmp=true
-PrivateDevices=true
-
-# We give no capabilities to a service by default
-CapabilityBoundingSet=
-AmbientCapabilities=
-
-# Protect the following from modification:
-# - The entire filesystem
-# - sysctl settings and loaded kernel modules
-# - No modifications allowed to Control Groups
-# - Hostname
-# - System Clock
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ProtectKernelTunables=true
-ProtectKernelModules=true
-ProtectControlGroups=true
-ProtectClock=true
-ProtectHostname=true
-
-# Prevent access to the following:
-# - /home directory
-# - Kernel logs
-ProtectHome=tmpfs
-ProtectKernelLogs=true
-
-# Make sure that the process can only see PIDs and process details of itself,
-# and the second option disables seeing details of things like system load and
-# I/O etc
-ProtectProc=invisible
-ProcSubset=pid
-
-# While not needed, we set these options explicitly
-# - This process has been given access to the host network
-# - It can also communicate with any IP Address
-PrivateNetwork=false
-RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX
-IPAddressAllow=any
-
-# Restrict system calls to a sane bunch
-SystemCallArchitectures=native
-SystemCallFilter=@system-service
-SystemCallFilter=~@privileged @resources @obsolete
-
-# Misc restrictions
-# - Since the process is a python process it needs to be able to write and
-#   execute memory regions, so we set MemoryDenyWriteExecute to false
-RestrictSUIDSGID=true
-RemoveIPC=true
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-RestrictRealtime=true
-RestrictNamespaces=true
-LockPersonality=true
-PrivateUsers=true
-MemoryDenyWriteExecute=false
diff --git a/docs/systemd-with-workers/README.md b/docs/systemd-with-workers/README.md
index 074e1ead57..19ac1a3306 100644
--- a/docs/systemd-with-workers/README.md
+++ b/docs/systemd-with-workers/README.md
@@ -74,8 +74,8 @@ systemctl restart matrix-synapse.target
 `/etc/systemd/system/matrix-synapse.service.d/override-hardened.conf` (the
 directory may have to be created). It enables certain sandboxing features in
 systemd to further secure the synapse service. You may read the comments to
-understand what the override file is doing. A similar override file at
-`contrib/systemd-with-workers/override-hardened-worker.conf` may be copied to
+understand what the override file is doing. The same file at may also be copied
+to
 `/etc/systemd/system/matrix-synapse-worker@.service.d/override-hardened-worker.conf`
 (this directory may also have to be created) in order to apply the same
 hardening options to any worker processes.
@@ -88,12 +88,8 @@ specified locations.
 ```sh
 systemctl daemon-reload
 
-# Restart the master
-systemctl restart matrix-synapse.service
-
-# If using a worker-based setup, restart the workers too.
-# To restart a specific worker (eg. federation_reader):
-systemctl restart matrix-synapse-worker@federation_reader.service
+# Restart the services
+systemctl restart matrix-synapse.target
 ```
 
 In order to see their effect, you may run `systemd-analyze security